France, its economy, its sociology - JP Orfeuil [EN]

Introduction

The questions related to transport and mobility are, with housing problems, at the first place in the concerns of the Ile-de-France population. Many projects led by public bodies, from municipalities to the  region and the national government, try to deal with different problems : improvement of the conditions of mobility, answer to concerns such as quality of life, health, environment, improvement of the attractivity of Ile-de-France in the competition of world cities. These goals are complementary and contradictory. Understanding the logics of public policy building by the institutions needs to refer to the political, economical and sociological history. Chapters I and II are devoted to that topic, respectively for France ans Ile-de-France. A detailed description of the current state of the system is of course also needed, and chapter III deals with that question. We then  analyse in chapter IV current proposed policies and the controversies which they raise.

    

I France, its economy, its sociology

1 The French economy:from strong growth to relative stagnation

With GDP of €1906 billion (€30,740 per person) in 2008, France unquestionably belongs to the club of rich nations, where the economy is dominated by services.This wealth was gradually built up over the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century. Growth accelerated between 1945 and 1975 at a rate of 5% a year, with a modernising State elite which imported fordist techniques from the USA and applied them to areas as diverse as agriculture, industry, budget rationalisation, planning and construction, infrastructure development, etc. After 1975, with the oil crises and the end of fordism as the sole method applied in all fields, growth settled at around 2% until the end of the century, and has fallen further with the new century. This relative decline, in a period when world growth stands at around 5%, is a source of concern to some politicians, and is reflected in people’s morale and in their day-to-day lives when companies fail.

 

As individuals and at family level, the French tend to be good money managers, with high levels of savings, moderate personal debt levels and prudent use of assets (homeownership, financing their children’s education).It can be said with reasonable confidence that the country is safe from an internally generated “sub-prime” crisis. This wealthy situation is apprciated, even though the people who get rich too fast are not as appreciated than in the USA or China.  However, they distrust the market economy and globalisation. As a country where emigration has historically been low, there is little affection for economic internationalisation, especially as certain products that epitomise such globalisation (e.g. the Big Mac), come from the US, a country with which the French have a psychological problem. This is the reason why we consider as important to draw the picture of the french sociology, a mix of values inherited from the past and current pessimistic values[1].

  

2 The French society : its history, its values, its representation of cohesion

Franceis a rich country with a temperate climate and varied landscape, with a reputation for good food and good living.This collective richness is a source of approval – personal enrichment and ostentatious wealth, less so.It is tolerated for football players and show business celebrities, but less accepted in the business world.For the authorities, the French have – from Louis XIV to Napoleon to de Gaulle – become accustomed to being part of a great nation and the public spending concomitant with that status.

         

This perception is correct, and yet the atmosphere, in Schumpeter's sense of the term, is one of pessimism. Book after book by economists talks either of “standing still” (Pigasse) or, more often, of decline (Baverez). Sociologists speak of growing fractures in society, about community “disconnection” (Castel, Donzelot, Paugam…), whilst planners and developers seek responses to “urban fragmentation”. Specialists in anthropology and social psychology (Ehrenberg) are trying to understand the nature of the “French malaise”, to analyse this state of rising collective neurasthenia (Rosanvallon, Fitoussi, etc.).

Understanding the behaviours and expectations of the parties involved, even in a restricted field like urban mobility management, entails - in France and in most of the big democracies - understanding the values, expectations, experiences and beliefs of the population, and a political sociology of the different actors, whether ordinary citizens or political decision-makers. Below, we try to put together a picture of the elements, comparing them wherever possible with those pertaining in the USA, a model much better known in the global arena than the French model and a benchmark in the current process of globalisation. Like all the European countries, France has a long history behind it, which over the centuries has laid down layer on layer of value systems out of which its identity has formed. Let us take a brief historical look at how that identity was forged.

2.1 The legacy of monarchy: the three estates, greatness, honour

Geographically extensive, France is a patchwork of peoples with little inherent inclination to nationhood, so from very early on its unification required a strong and centralised State, a powerful monarch capable of giving the people the symbols of the country’s greatness, places such as Versailles, a greatness also evidenced, for example, by the use of the French language amongst the 19th century European elite. Because of its size and its geography, it did not, like other European countries (Netherlands, Great Britain), need to adopt a very early strategy of specialisation and openness to international trade.  

In addition, not unusually in Europe, though in contrast with North America, for centuries the society was made up of compartmentalised estates. The aristocracy, the clergy, the guilds of artisans and merchants, the independent professions with State duties (e.g. notaries, etc.), the peasants, lived with different identities (honour for the nobility, skill for artisans, accumulation for merchants, who often converted their wealth into land, dispossessing the peasants in the process).   

The legacy of this apparently long gone era is very much alive, and not confined to material expressions such as stately homes, which favourable tax conditions have kept numerous and well maintained.  

Other manifestations are the power of the luxury and craft industries, the (purported) distaste of the French for “industrial food”, their incapacity throughout the whole of the first half of the 20th century to develop car manufacturing from a craft activity to a mass industry, and of course the power of industrial sectors that serve state priorities, such as aerospace, nuclear, high-speed trains, etc.  

In addition, more than two centuries after the revolution that turned the country into a republic, a certain attachment to land ownership and heritage and a certain attachment to status divisions. So the elite educational establishments, the Grandes Écoles, products of monarchy and then empire, have maintained their development from one republic to the next and created what Pierre Bourdieu has called a State Aristocracy. Even today, graduates of these institutions constitute most of the bosses of big companies and the directors of the big civil service departments (and a significant proportion of political leaders). At a lower level, public sector and civil service jobs continue to have a special and highly protected status.  

Also from this period France has retained a certain contempt for capitalist accumulation, more frequently perceived as rapacity than as value creation. Distinction, the canons of culture and taste, are produced by families that have been established for several generations and a system of education that reproduces these values, not by “arrivistes” (the new rich, usually a reference to the USA). Less familiar but also a reality, the attachment of the French to their jobs, the “system of honour” identified by P. D’Iribarne, is much greater than elsewhere in Europe, according to comparative surveys: the relation to work is not simply a private contract that can be cancelled at any time.  

And finally, especially since the advent of the Fifth Republic and the election of the president by direct universal suffrage, the production of symbols of greatness untrammelled by cost or efficiency constraints, has been transferred from the monarch to the Republican State and its President. De Gaulle’s famous phrase, “l’intendance suivra” (loosely, leave the details to the accountants), expresses the State’s lack of interest in the economics of its projects. This is true in many areas, not least transport. 

It should be noted that this period leaves little room for the notion of autonomy, a founding principle of North American cultural identity, in which the unattached individual constructs his own life in a space with few other occupants and with no caste divisions (if we exclude natives and slaves). In French culture, the State, and by extension government, is seen above all as a protector, whereas in Anglo-Saxon culture it is seen more as a predator. 

2.2 The legacy of the Republic, from the revolution to the trente glorieuses: from imposed autonomy to acquired, state-guaranteed protection

By postulating the liberty and equality of all citizens and dissolving the guilds, the French Revolution dismantled the old order, its division of social space into estates, its communities of belonging and solidarity (the parishes), without proposing new structures of belonging. For its part, the Industrial Revolution, by enabling the rapid accumulation of capital and the emergence of an industrial bourgeoisie, quickly generated a labour force with pitiful and precarious living conditions. The first half of the 19th century, during which peasants escaped poverty to find misery, was probably the time in our history when society demanded the greatest capacity for autonomy from the individual. It left a legacy of bad memories and the concept of the “free fox in the free henhouse” very much dominated that of freedom of enterprise and collective benefit, the perception that underpins the central value of autonomy in the USA. This concept would become the foundation of class consciousness and class struggle. It would take one century (broadly from 1850 to 1950) to build the institutions that represent a society of solidarity, while preserving the values of liberty and equality. The edifice would stand upon four pillars, which would be consolidated in their current form in the immediate post-war period. 

First, a pillar of integration – compulsory, secular, public schooling. Originally intended to inculcate into each individual the basics of citizenship, it would gradually take on another role, that of the benchmark institution for maintaining equal opportunities, an egalitarian instrument for offering all children the same chances in life. This principle, initially rooted in primary schooling, gradually expanded to encompass secondary and higher education, which are primarily financed from the public purse.

Second, a pillar of employment and tax standards, managed by the State, with norms imposed on the labour market (child labour, female labour, working hours, minimum wage, etc.) and progressive taxation in order to redistribute wealth through the State. The priority is to control inequalities of position, in the name of equality, in such a way as to keep them at acceptable levels. 

A pillar that originated in the voluntary sector and was gradually nationalised, seeking to insure individuals against the monetary consequences of the risks of living. The “Welfare State” uses collective, compulsory and nonmarket systems to insure against the risks of workplace accident, illness and unemployment, and to provide additional income for families and replacement income for pensioners. This system is central in the perception of what society is, and Alain Ehrenberg accurately point out the difference between “equality à la française”, with its focus on equality of protection, and its US counterpart, which primarily focuses on equality of opportunity.

The final pillar is the public services. Some of them arose out of an economic rationale: the nationalisation of natural monopolies. The majority, however, exist to transform formal rights associated with freedom into actual enforceable rights: the social housing sector is supposed to embody “the right to a roof”, dispensaries the “right to health”, public transport the “right to transport”, etc. The essential basic services must be “outside the market”, with prices that provide universal access to these services.  

2.3 « Les trente glorieuses »: the discovery of autonomy in consumption and lifestyles

The 30 post-war years from 1945 to 1975, christened the “30 glorieuses” by Jean Fourastié, is a period when a strong State organises the transition of a primarily agricultural and rural country, with a high proportion of self-employed workers (small craftsmen, small shopkeepers), into a largely industrial and urban country where salaried employment is the norm, with an efficient administration and technocracy importing its “scientific” methods from the USA. Economic growth is strong (around 5% a year), the future is perceived as predictable (this is the big era of planning in all areas), growing unemployment is founded on a stable relationship between employee and company, the economy’s needs for skilled labour (and particularly for managers) make upward social mobility possible, there is a general belief that children will live better than their parents. The drivers of the economy are essentially internal. 

Consumption develops. It is partly driven by social norms (people have to have a refrigerator or a television, and soon a car, like their neighbours or friends), but very quickly an extensive middle class ceases to bow to necessity in its consumption patterns. Larger incomes allow choices, and it is through consumption and what Gilles Lipovetski describes as the “process of personalisation” that autonomy is achieved. This ability to choose lifestyles continues to grow in all areas. In private life, with birth control, the legalisation of abortion, easier divorce, growing female access to the labour market. In career development, with greater access to higher education and a diversity of training opportunities. With the car, which would increase the scope of residential choice beyond the vicinity of the workplace or areas with public transport services. What we have here are the concrete conditions for the enactment of the “society of individuals” that so exercised authors from de Tocqueville to Lyotard. This remains a happy period in the collective memory, even though the excesses of mass consumption were denounced by intellectuals and were a major contributing factor in the student revolt of 1968. One of its slogans, “you don’t fall in love with a growth rate” was the first sign of a development that has become a strong feature of today’s world, the role of emotion in the government of the State and the symbolic devaluation of growth for growth’s sake. The equation of growth with progress begins to be questioned (with talk of the “fallout from progress”), scientific and technical development cease to be automatically associated with progress, environmental deterioration begins to be apparent and doubts emerge about the possibility of indefinitely pursuing this model. These questions are widely reported in the media, which in fact have become not only the main forum of debate about the State, but also the force that imposes the terms of the debate, giving increasing airspace to emotion and reducing the place of reasoned argument.

2.4 Modern times: fear and loss of confidence

The state of society did not change overnight, but the dynamics and prospects are radically different.  

Economic growth fell from an average of 5% to 2%, and has fluctuated around 1% since the beginning of the 21st century, very much below the world average. Under these conditions, “upward social mobility” has broken down, the highly skilled jobs being created in the private sector are inferior, in “quantity” and in “quality”, to the numbers emerging from higher education. The question of “downgrading”, both in the sense of not having such a good job as one’s parents and of not having a job commensurate with one’s qualifications, has become a public issue. There is a crisis of confidence in the future.   

In heavy industry workforces, in particular the unskilled, are melting away. Private sector employment, including unskilled work, is only increasing in small businesses and services, conditions less favourable to the establishment of class-based collectives: class divisions in society have not disappeared, but the structures in which class consciousness emerges have collapsed. Today, being at the “bottom” of the social ladder is seen less as a matter of the class we are born into than as a personal failure in our life trajectory, which rules out the possibility of the hope and shared warmth generated by a collective sense of belonging, leaving only phenomena of compassion in their place. “Our society has been overtaken by compassion for the vulnerable, the poor, those in distress…The vocabulary of class struggle has given way to that of insecurity and protection, we prefer to speak of fracture than of conflict” (MRA, p7). The “social question”, formerly considered almost exclusively through the prism of the sociology of social groups, is now approached much more in terms of individual psychology.  

In today’s more competitive markets, business values its workers for their responsiveness and initiative, and is less reluctant to let them go if the markets are unfavourable, although the main “adjustment variable” is youth recruitment. Indeed, the protective mechanisms of the Welfare State continue to play a certain role for working people (insiders), whereas the main burden is primarily born by potential incomers, who have to seek their way into the labour market through temporary jobs. There has been a shift from a time when a qualification was an entry to a stable career to a time when people have to be ready to adapt and reinvent themselves throughout their lives, both in the world of work and in the family. As one sociologist jokes, the important thing is not to be employed and be married, but to remain employable and marriageable. 

In fact, this instability affects only part of the workforce, those employed in companies exposed to international competition, mainly in industry. The other characteristic of the period is the rise of employment in or dependent on the public sector (e.g. doctors) in the fields of education, health, social work and urban planning. These jobs generally vary in status, but they are protected and sought after. A large and growing middle-class is being replaced by a multitude of particular positions defending their specific advantages, with the result that there is a sense of a fragmented society, with a low level of trust between individuals. 

Against a background of opening markets, the competitiveness of the French economy seems to be under attack “from below” (low-wage emerging economies) and “from above” (new technologies coming out of the Californian melting pot), without any clear idea of what the country’s strengths are. The mobility of capital, of the holders of capital (tax evasion) or simply of entrepreneurs is seen as a limiting factor on nationally structured mechanisms of redistribution. Maintaining the French model of redistribution seems more difficult. An economy that is more open to the outside has its ups (rare) and its downs (frequent) reflecting international conditions, giving the (justified) sense that the “efficient pilot” of the previous era (the State) no longer has its hands on the controls and is no longer able – nor anyone else for that matter – to steer events, There is a crisis in perceptions of the future.

This crisis is all the more marked in that the founding pillars of “French-style social compromise” are gradually becoming less of a solution than a problem. The “welfare state”, a system of rights-obligations (insurances of all kinds) and public services, are seen by many as likely to hinder the country’s competitiveness in an economy that is open to the world. The debates that have always existed between right and left about how much the state should redistribute are no longer simply a matter of political beliefs: it is claimed that too much redistribution will drive the rich abroad and reduce the pot available for redistribution. The same is true for social protection, which is undisputed in ethical terms, but questioned on the grounds of efficiency: being essentially funded from contributions based on employment contracts, it generates higher labour costs for employers than those experienced by our main economic partners and is therefore a potential factor in reducing competitiveness. In addition, structural growth in needs (in particular associated with an ageing population) will entail either a reduction in “rights”, or new methods of funding. Pension reform (an ongoing issue in France) is a good example of this process. So the consequence of the opening up of the economy and of globalisation is a loss of the society’s collective capacity to decide the ways it wants to live together, and a sense of “decline”.  

As for public services (in particular transport), the European Union has clearly stated its wish to see more market mechanisms in the provision of such services. For the moment, France has shown – even with right wing governments – a certain attachment to the principles of a universal public service, with significant nuances. The big national service networks (electricity, telephone, post) are increasingly market-driven, but the networks with more local functions, such as urban public transport and in particular the Ratp and Sncf rail companies in Île-de-France, maintain their public service character.

In these circumstances, the attitude to government is complex. On the one hand, it is expected to maintain acquired benefits (unemployment, retirement, sickness, etc.) and to protect against new risks, as evidenced by the response to crises (mad cow disease, swine flu) where the State is in the forefront, by the inclusion of the precautionary principle in the constitution of the Republic, and by its increasing interest in the environment, reflected in initiatives such as the “Grenelle de l’environnement”. This very strong environmental sensibility can be explained by at least three factors: firstly, a sense of being “behind”, in particular compared with the Northern European countries where this awareness emerged sooner; secondly, the idea that “while globalisation is imposed on us, the land depends on us”, and that territorial organisation and the choice of the means of transport should express this sensibility. Finally and probably most importantly, the sense of a “finite world” (the world we see in photos of the earth from space) demands that we review the way we go about development, and in particular our consumption of fossil fuels, which is anyway under threat from the growing appetite of the big emerging countries. This perception has become a major determining factor in transport policies. 

At the same time, the practical expressions of an interest in public affairs, such as membership of political parties or unions, are in clear decline, while mockery of politics is an increasingly popular element of mass audience television programmes. At a more local level, there is – precisely as a result of the growth in mobility – a widening gap between the institutions charged with improving people’s day-to-day lives (local communities) and what people experience across the broader territory. The difficulties encountered by “developers” in their public works operations (roads, high-speed rail lines, high-voltage cables, etc., opposed primarily on environmental grounds) have prompted them to import from the Anglo-Saxon world a variety of procedures of information, consultation and debate at different stages of their projects. Today, all these processes and procedures have taken on a life of their own, distinct from the original environmental impetus. Through these debates, politicians try to reconnect with their voters and to establish new territorial identities that reflect them. All public works operations of a certain scale are now preceded by long processes of consultation and debate, which are helping to shift the basis of evaluation from an approach embedded in rational expertise (with its qualities and defects) to an approach founded on public approval. In fact, this approval can be pursued from the start, in a way “be an integral part of the project”, by choosing projects that are spectacular and media friendly.   

At the same time, the population feels that government powers are increasingly limited and, where this is possible, seeks to construct its own protections.This is apparent in particular in the places where people decide to live, choosing their homes on the basis of the social composition of the neighbourhood and the quality of the schools, in a growing preference (seen in all the Latin countries) for homeownership, in an increasing desire to control the social and environmental conditions of the home surroundings. These factors can come into conflict with a wider quest for social cohesion promulgated by government, often with public backing, through measures such as socially mixed schools and residential neighbourhoods. These points will be covered in greater detail in the section on Île-de-France. To conclude this general section, the tables I.1 and I.2 below sum up the atmosphere of the country today and the most widespread perceptions of the future. The final table (I.3) provides an overview of changes over the last 50 years, i.e. in two generations. 

 

Table I.1

The current atmosphere in France

 

France’s place in the world	A country with much less influence in the world than before, though influential in Europe. Globalisation is more a threat than an opportunity, although it allows many products to be acquired cheaply. In particular, it is a threat to our identity and to the preservation of our social model.
The situation of the French	The dominant impression is of “treading water” for at least the last ten years, with prospects of decline. There is an overriding belief that children will be less well off than their parents.
Social cohesion	The welfare state is a valuable good, but it is under threat: collective protection will decline.
The environment	A fast-growing concern. The idea of a finite world is dominant. It is a precious thing, preserving it is a categorical imperative, and France must be exemplary, especially on certain key issues:  climate change, landscape protection, opposition to GMOs, etc.

 

 

 

Table I.2 

Cuurent perceptions of the future in France

 

Relation to the past	It is important to keep a link with the past, in particular by preserving architectural and urban heritage and rural landscape, the basis of a specific identity at a time when globalisation is seen as imposing uniformity, etc.
Relation to the future	We have moved from a positive vision of the future to a stage when we no longer trust blindly in science and technology to build a better future (e.g. opposition to GMOs) and then to a stage of anxiety, where we are automatically suspicious of innovation (precautionary principle) while at the same time continuing to welcome high-tech products, especially in the IT and telecommunication fields.

 

 

 

 

Table I.3

 Main evolution over a half-century 

 

	1960s	1980s	2000s
General atmosphere, perception of the future	Building a predictable future which will benefit everybody, trust the elites for economic development.	Recognise differences, regional identities, negotiate the future.	Avoid predicted disasters (oil, climate, loss of mobility for the poor, etc.).
Society’s self-representation	A class society, one-dimensional inequalities (income), growth leads to more redistribution (cohesion via democratic social compromise).	Groups with different values, multidimensional inequalities (quality of life) harder to correct through redistribution, emergence of new categories (women, regionalism, gays, visible minorities, etc.). Cohesion through recognition of fragmented interests.	Global threats (above) and individual threats associated with careers (exclusion replaces poverty). Cohesion by categorical imperative (global threat), compassion and individuated protection (individuated threats).
Main method of transformation	Class struggle in the workplace, acquisition of state power.	Extension of the class struggle to society and the regions, incorporation into local government.	Following of public opinion, power in the “vibe”.
Central values	Progress, the public interest.	Recognition and respect for organised groups with a diversity of interests and concerns.	Fear, anxiety, compassion linked to the process of personalisation.
Vision of the city	The land as the medium of national policies.	The land: multifunctional, different functions and dimensions to respect.	The land: a precious good, an identity that must be protected from globalisation.
Mobility priorities	Dealing with the constant growth in car ownership.	Rising perception of the disadvantages of constantly growing car use.	Getting rid of the need for the car.
Vision of the car	Valued.	Needs taming.	Demonised.
Stakeholders	The state in a position of leadership, technocratic elites increasing their powers.	Stakeholders interactively organised, new generations of skills outside the traditional circuits.	Opinion, no need to have expertise in order to make a judgement.
Type of thinking in the representation of the problem	Linear, no feedback loop.	Multi dimensional and aware of feedback effects.	Finite world, categorical imperative, the purpose of action is to prevent the prediction coming true.
Benchmark territory	Nation	Local (decentralisation)	World via the virtual
Stage	Domination of the state stage, Planning Commission as consultation tool between technocrats (infrastructure, finance, etc.). Local variants by elected local governments.	Territorial debates, arguments “for” and “against” formalised by “elites” and “counter-elites”, possible consequences for local elections.	Mass media to spread fear, blogs, internet to disseminate emotions and generate solutions.
Approach to problems	Numbers	Words and arguments	Pictures
Main principle of decision-making	Demonstration	Negotiation	Emotion
What is proposed	Shut up	Let’s talk, it will get us somewhere	Chat, it is the intensity of the vibe that counts, “whatever…”
What is sacrificed	Land, sociable public spaces, alternative modes (PT, pedestrians, etc.).	Purely pragmatic rationality	Pragmatic rationality, even in negotiation (debate between Sdrif/Grand Huit), risk of ineffectiveness (not achieving goals) and inefficiency (lack of cost effectiveness).
What gained by it	Pragmatic effectiveness (cost effectiveness), achievement of simple goals.	Public space, respect for others. Achievement of more complex goals, with no guarantee of efficiency (cost effectiveness).	Access to immediate and effortless self-expression for all.

 

3 A short history of representations of the vices and virtues of transport modes

Introduction

The short history presented here relates to the country as a whole, but it is very strongly influenced over time by the questions of mobility in Île-de-France. So it can be read from a “Francilian” perspective. We begin by retracing the dominant representations of the transport modes then look at current perceptions. 

3.1 The automobile: short history of a century of development

The automobile was born simultaneously in France and Germany at the beginning of the 20th century. These countries had already been set moving with horse-drawn carriages (for the upper classes), public transport (initially dominated by the tram, followed by the Metro in Paris in the early years of the century), and the bicycle, which had not yet been democratised and was still primarily used for country outings. 

The automobile was a new object, individually hand built. It was first taken up by aristocrats and the urban bourgeoisie (especially Parisians) who had previously owned private carriages. They discovered driving, in search of thrills and particularly speed (the first car races closely followed the invention of the object), and had no hesitation in imposing this norm on urban streets as well as roads. They would not tolerate other uses and users, be it hay carts, children at play or even pedestrians. The public space, already made dangerous by horse-drawn vehicles, was seen as even more so with fast moving automobiles. It became uncomfortable and polluted by the clouds of dust given off by the as yet unsurfaced tracks.

 The new “driving fools” developed intense group activities, directly inspired by the cyclists who had preceded them: they met in clubs and associations set up to promote their interests, improve the quality of roads and road signs, combat the disparate and varied traffic rules imposed by different mayors within their local spheres of influence, etc.

 The rich man’s toy would win its patriotic and practical spurs during World War I. Faced with the deficiencies of the railway and the slow pace of horse transport, the taxis of Paris were requisitioned to shuttle troops and equipment to the front, with great success (episode of the Marne taxis).

After the First World War, the automobile began to find more practical uses, for goods transport of course, but also for people needing to go the rounds of towns and villages (e.g. doctors, priests, etc.). It spread to the upper echelons of the population, beyond the circle of speed lovers, simply bringing them freedom and comfort of travel, but would not become more widely affordable until the end of World War II. Throughout this whole period, the automobile remained a powerful and visible marker of social status. It helped to maintain society’s visible division into established categories.

The period of reconstruction that began after the Second World War (France’s previously mentioned “trente glorieuses”) represented an alliance between a project to modernise society through consumption and a democratic project. In the car industry, this took the form of Fordist mass production of models that gradually became affordable throughout the population. The consumer society – of which the car is the most visible symbol – united society, despite the criticisms of intellectuals who saw it as a vehicle (!) of working-class embourgeoisement and the weakening of class consciousness.

The State became aware of the infrastructure needs generated by this widespread car use and, in a quarter of a century, build most of the primary network we see today. This was done without much concern either for the geographical fractures it created wherever it went (with the exception of a few very valuable areas that influential people could “defend”), or for the impact of these projects on urban dynamics, as the urban outskirts became accessible as a place to live (urban sprawl, discovered in the late 1970s). As for the historic parts of the cities, they were immersed in a tidal wave of cars. In Île-de-France in particular, where demographic growth was most intense, this thrombosis led to the 1965 master plan, the new towns and the first stages of the RER railway network.

The events of 1968 constituted the first rumblings against this forced march towards a society in which “you spend your life earning”. Since then, there have been recurrent after-shocks of varying intensity: the 1974 oil crisis, interpreted as a first sign of oil running out as a resource, presaging the death of the car; a realisation of the unacceptable numbers of deaths on the roads; success will opposition to several planned urban motorways; development of the environmental movements, for which the car “pollutes and makes people dumb”; riding public health concerns, the emergence of global warming as an issue, usually linked in the media with pictures of traffic jams.

The Government continued to pursue its programme of infrastructure development until the mid-80s. It tried to set up a structured dialogue with its opponents (series of laws on consultation and public debate), it “handed over” powers to local authorities (decentralisation laws), encouraged cost benefit analysis (valuation of damage or external costs in assessing infrastructures), and conducted active road safety policies with spectacular results. 

It was in the mid-1980s that it finally gave up and adopted its opponents’ point of view, widely promulgated in the media, in the name of the environment. The 1996 law on air quality and rational energy use started with a legitimate premiss (every citydweller has the right to healthy air) but chose a method that is open to discussion, reductions in car traffic brought about through urban travel plans. A later law on energy (2005) stipulates that France is committed to a “Factor 4” process (undertaking to reduce CO2 emissions by a factor of four by 2050). These laws had no direct operational effect, and were more like statements of intent. This does not alter the fact that public policies, whether national or local, must demonstrate their compatibility with these laws. They therefore implicitly forbid or inhibit policies designed to satisfy transport demand and thereby increase traffic by means of new infrastructures or even by more efficient use of existing infrastructures. Moreover, in 2007 the Government gave a strong signal by shutting down the infrastructure ministry and incorporating its teams into a big ministry of ecology and sustainable development.  

More recently, the Government continued its process of disengagement from road infrastructures by transferring responsibility for a large proportion of national roads to France’s regional Departments. With the “Grenelle de l’Environnement” national environmental consultation, it is trying to win over the core media with a new form of governance in which civil society is widely involved in public policies. As regards mobility, the main outcome is a system of penalties and incentives for the purchase of new private cars (taxes for cars with high emissions, subsidies for those with low emissions and those with low consumption, a scheme which has been highly successful) and the resumption of investment in trams and high-speed trains, with allocated budgets, which are nevertheless likely to be phased in over time.

Table I.4

Dominant representations of the car and the city

 

	1900-1945	1945-1975	1975-1995	1995-2010
Dominant representation	An object unaffordable for most people, mirroring the social hierarchy	An object to make affordable for everyone, and opportunities for the country’s economy, ownership that signals access to the lower-middle-class	An object and uses that require civilising: safety, pollution, noise. Cities are for “living in” as well as “producing in”.	An object to be eradicated:  the world is finite and threatened by global warming, oil will soon run out.
Dominant conflict	The space, dignity and rights of individuals in urban streets	Little discordance. The city and its networks need to welcome and stimulate growth and adapt to modern travel conditions. Gradual realisation of the “price of progress”: unpleasant cities, road deaths, local pollution.	About the new infrastructures and the sharing of urban space.	Has disappeared: the authorities, media and public opinion agree. However, the car is still (and increasingly) needed on a day-to-day basis. The arena of conflict is internalised.

 

Table I.5

  The hierarchy of views on cars, car use and car traffic

 

	Ranking in Paris area in 2010	Ranking in Paris area in 1990	Ranking at national level in 2010	Ranking at national level in 1990
Car ownership and use is a symbol of individualism
Growing car use is the result of lobbying by the public works industry, road builders and car manufacturers who make a lot of money
Car ownership will remain the symbol of personal success in society, and will not be affordable for all households			4
The dream of  (growing) car ownership keeps society together
The “car system” (vehicles, infrastructure, insurance, etc.) is key to economic growth				1
The “car system” is key to people’s freedom to go where they want and when they want
Growing car ownership jeopardizes P.T. development		4		4
The car will always be a more expensive way of travelling than P.T.
Card make people aggressive and dangerous to others				2
Car use, and the related infrastructure needs, destroys the city’s historic fabric and  social life in public space	5	2
Higher levels of car ownership stimulate urban sprawl	4	3	2
Car does pollutes the local environment and creates health problems	3	1	3	3
Car use is unsustainable in the long run because of falling oil reserves and  climate change	2		1
Car use is ultimately unsustainable because the capacity of the road network will never match demand	1

 

 

3.2 Public transport

For almost a century (1850-1950), public transport was for most people the primary way of accessing the entire city from their home neighbourhood. For the authorities, it was the principal means of the physical expansion of cities, a way of combating perceived excesses of density and, more discreetly, of maintaining the social division of space, which justified very early use of public subsidies for the operators and public intervention on fares, to ensure that less well-paid workers could live at a distance from their workplace. Passenger numbers continued to increase until the Second World War.

The situation was reversed at the end of the 1950s, with a combination of falling passenger numbers and rising car ownership, policies of fare increases designed to ensure better coverage of costs by the remaining users and, for buses – then the most popular means of transport – growing traffic problems. The authorities, accepting a smaller role in urban mobility as a result of widespread car use, nevertheless responded by introducing dedicated bus lanes (1964), planning extensions of the Metro system into the suburbs and in particular by launching the RER light railway network in concert with their plans for new towns. The implicit idea was a sharing of roles between the RER, to link these new towns with Paris, and the car, which would provide transport within these towns and access to the stations through park-and-ride centres. 

Following the events of 1968 and the passenger protests in the early 1970s, the Government realised that urban public transport would remain a necessity for two reasons: to protect heritage and quality-of-life in city centres and provide access to mobility for young people, the elderly and people on low incomes. Against a background of continuing economic growth, it established urban transport zones and introduced the Transport Contribution tax on companies located within those zones, based on their payroll. The justification for the tax was the indirect benefits the existence of these public transport networks brought to companies, and it was hypothecated to the public transport authorities. This tax came to represent a lasting resource which the public transport authorities and networks would use to improve existing services and invest in new systems, without increasing fares or significantly increasing productivity. This boost in the early 1970s and the guarantee of growth in the resources provided by the transport tax (arising from growing payroll sizes, higher rates, expanding scope) made it possible for the systems to be transferred smoothly to the local authorities in 1982 (a process not completed in Île-de-France until 2005). After decentralisation, the Government would continue to provide indirect support for the development of the networks. It did this through incentives, by contributing to project funding, which was increasingly allocated to road projects designed to limit the space set aside for cars, and through legal means, in particular by requiring the authorities responsible for public transport to draw up “Urban Transport Plans” including components designed to reduce car traffic.  Public transport would continue to be seen as a solution to multiple problems: reducing inner-city congestion, enhancing mobility in vulnerable populations, symbolising the unification of urban areas around a “transport hub”, supporting workers (employers in Île-de-France paying half the cost of season-tickets), combating local pollution and combating the greenhouse effect, contributing to public health through the walking required between stations and to make connections, etc.

Table I.6

The dominant representations of public transport

 

1900-1945	1945-1965	1965-1975	1975-2007	2007-2010
Public transport is the benchmark method for meeting urban mobility needs	The erosion of quality of service and passenger numbers is normal, the car is destined to become the benchmark system	Public transport must help to protect historic town centres from car pressure and support the polycentric Paris + New Towns + La Défense project  Their “social” function is emphasised	The previous goals are maintained. In addition, they should “get drivers out of their cars” to combat local pollution, then the greenhouse effect, then obesity	The function of the “Greater Paris transport network” is to structure a global metropolis into specialised development hubs

 

3.3 Motorcycles.

In 1960, there were as many motorised bikes as cars in France, because they were much more affordable for household budgets. However, they were and mostly continue to be absent from the mental landscape of the planning elite. Their history since then has been one of marked decline, followed by the inklings of a renaissance in the last 15 years or so, though they continue to be a component of the transport mix.

Low powered vehicles (mopeds) were largely used by teenagers, young people and workers, for whom they were a convenient way of getting to the workplace, especially outside normal public transport timetables or coverage zones. The perceived riskiness of this mode of transport and the lack of political will to do anything about it by appropriate infrastructure management, the increase in obligations (compulsory helmets) and costs (in particular insurance), significantly reduced their use.  The renewal of public transport took young people towards mass transit, the democratisation of the automobile took workers towards the car, and the standard residual image of the moped rider coincides with that of the pizza deliverer: small job, small vehicle, small brain.

Higher powered vehicles (scooters, motorbikes) have also followed a trajectory of decline and marginalisation. The motorbike nevertheless retained a certain aura, if for no other reason than it was used by traffic police… and journalists have always been very willing to report demonstrations by “angry motorcyclists”, which makes measures to regulate them somewhat problematic. The number of scooter riders and motorcyclists has increased in the last 15 years as a result of two phenomena: the removal of the need for a special driving licence for vehicles under 125 cc (a car licence is enough), and the growing problems of driving and parking in city centres, especially in Paris. They have become the favourite mode for young urban professionals, who are on the move a great deal for both work and leisure, and see them as the only method of transport in city centres that offers guaranteed travel time and guaranteed parking, in return for a significantly increased but acceptable risk.

3.4 Bicycles

In its early days, the bicycle, like the car, was a method of transport for thrill seekers, disrupting the normal uses of the public space by its speed, the sense of superiority it induced in its users and their tendency to move around in groups on tourist outings. It was then taken up by the working classes for practical purposes (getting to work) and for leisure (tourism, possibly in combination with the train). Then, for several decades, its function was confined to extra-urban recreation (weekends and holidays in the country, the Tour de France). Its usefulness re-emerged in 1968, when petrol was short and public transport was on strike. The ecologists, the children of 68, began to promote its day-to-day virtues from the 70s onwards. A little later, they were joined by the medical profession, who emphasised the health benefits of cycling (cardiac exercise, weight loss). This movement was primarily reflected in the emergence of sports clubs and apartment bicycles, by green cycle lanes in Paris, for which motorists had so little respect that their users christened them “corridors of death”, and by terminological changes in the French specialist literature.  Initially classed as a “two-wheeler” alongside motorcycles, then in the category of “green transport” or “alternative to the car”, alongside public transport, it is now defined as an “active mode” alongside walking and rollerblading. It was a new crisis (the great public transport strike of 1995, which lasted more than a month) which restored its place in the saddle and in the mental universe of Paris. It was an innovation aimed at students in Rennes (a self-service bicycle system), its spread to the public as a whole and its success in a major city (Velo’v in Lyon) that prompted the Paris authorities to develop Velib (20,000 self-service bicycles), all services that have restored the bicycle’s role in day-to-day travel and its legitimacy in the public space, and at the same time have encouraged people to use their own bicycles.      

3 .5 Mobility and transport modes today: viewpoints

3.5.1 The media

The dominant viewpoints expressed by the mainstream press and media are primarily anti-car. The question of atmospheric pollution has been high on the agenda since the 1980s. Every scientific study on the subject, in particular by physicians working in public health, can be sure of receiving good media coverage. Today, this anti-car sentiment is also driven by worries about the future, the fear of climate change, the prospects of sharp rises in the price of oil driven by economic development in the emerging countries, and on more local factors – the absurdity (very easy to convey visually) of traffic jams and the (not always false) perception of traffic as “brutalising” the city and its inhabitants.¹  It is facilitated by the very “Parisian” culture of most of these media. In fact, inner Paris is an area, actually the only area in France, where it easy to do without a car, and where a very small proportion of car traffic (compared with all the available modes) is enough to make the streets feel cramped. Certain other considerations sometimes emerge, such as car dependency in poorer suburban families, for whom the cost of car ownership represent a significant portion of the household budget. They respond positively to car sharing schemes when they are introduced by local authorities or new companies. Car sharing systems took centre stage when fuel prices rocketed (summer 2008), but have now fallen below the media radar. On the other hand, road safety has become less of a headline issue (doubtless as a result of remarkable improvements over the last 10 years) and there are fewer reports of conflicts about new roads, since none are being built.

As regards public transport, it tends to mirror French opinion which, in poll after poll, declares itself in favour of the development of public transport. Theoretical attitudes dominate: public transport needs to be developed, but not much is said about its real capacity to replace the other modes currently used. Questions of cost are very rarely covered, questions of fares more often. Nonetheless, the media continues to be critical of existing public transport provision, especially when quality of service is less than perfect: strikes, unreliability, congestion, passenger stress, etc. The dominant “anti-car” sentiment does not generate an undiluted loyalty to public transport.

Media attitudes to motorcycles are ambiguous, as is French opinion. Here, the chief question remains that of danger, real or perceived, with riders being identified with “victims” or “aggressors”, depending on the circumstances.

The media put across a positive image of the bicycle and of cyclists. The image of the self-service bicycle systems, very positive when the scheme was introduced, has become more ambivalent with the degree of deterioration and the operating costs, but is still very positive.

 3.5.2 The authorities

It is difficult to say that there is a Government position. There are Government positions, which vary from ministry to ministry. Industry wants a powerful automobile sector. This ministry works hard to help the sector in research, development and innovation (policy of competitive clusters, supporting the public profile of the car sector, with the equipment manufacturers) and provided valuable help to the industry in the recent economic crisis. However, its role is limited by the European framework and often influenced by an understandable wish to maintain industrial capacity in France, even though production costs, in particular for entry range models, are lower in Eastern Europe and on the south side of the Mediterranean.  Its interventions are not much reported in the media.

The Ministry of Ecology and Sustainable Development, which has absorbed the formerly powerful Infrastructure Ministry, represents values and promulgates laws aiming to reduce the presence of the car in society and its impact on the environment. The change of heart by a large professional community (civil engineers) in less than a generation is noteworthy: formerly committed to an ever expanding motorway network, they have become ardent advocates of sustainable development largely based on developing alternatives to the car. The socio-economic research funded by Predit (the public research programme on transport) also reflects this conversion. It seeks to identify the different “misdeeds” of the car (health, urban sprawl, etc.), to use long-term forecasts to warn about the difficulties of meeting the target of dividing CO2 emissions by 4 by 2050, to set up networks to explore alternatives… This conversion goes hand-in-hand with the abandonment of cost/benefit type analyses, with the official argument that these methods fail to take sufficient account of long-term effects, though with the less explicit aim of reducing the gap between the ministry’s positions and dominant public opinion. 

The hopes placed in the potential of electric cars would seem to be a point of possible compromise between the views of the two ministries. However, they are likely to worry the Ministry of Finance, which would simultaneously lose the abundant revenues from fuel taxes and be obliged to contribute to the purchase of electric cars, or else to formulate a new fiscal policy. Such a policy is beginning to emerge today, with the introduction of a traffic tax (restricted to HGVs), which will come into force in France a few years after Germany. 

Regional and local authorities and politicians have the political and technical responsibility of organising public transport networks in their areas and managing roads and parking. At the most local level of neighbourhoods and villages, residents primarily expect their elected representatives to send them visible signals that they are tackling environmental and quality of life issues, and to recognise the needs of the most vulnerable.  This expectation entails giving back the sidewalks to pedestrians, with extensive measures to improve the comfort and aesthetics of pavements and to make them easier to use for older people and those with reduced mobility. Local measures also include the rapid spread of priority residential parking in areas where parking presents a problem. In other words, after a long period when locals had to accept the universal “right of traffic”, they are increasingly being offered a special right, the right to be able to park their cars in the immediate vicinity of their home, outside the normal provisions of common law. Other traffic-related measures (pedestrian zones, 20 mph areas, the closure of certain streets to traffic at weekends or in summer, e.g. on the banks of the Seine in Paris, etc.) or non-traffic measures (e.g. the multiplication of car boot sales) pursue the same aim. Their intention is to develop sense of belonging and ownership, to reintroduce “village” values into the city, by limiting the pressure of “general” or passing traffic.

 The image of a conurbation depends greatly on the image of its main city, which is often the centre of the conurbation. At this scale residents and their elected representatives are very keen not to seem “left behind”. It is in this way that fashions, beliefs, quasi-doctrines become established. In the 1960s, the dominant idea was that every city of over a million people should have a metro system, and the 3 cities of this size each had one. In the 1980s and 1990s, the tram was the big idea. The big provincial cities had to have a tram network. The dominant argument was not so much about transport as about urban quality of life and the aesthetics of public space. A tramway project could be accompanied by a complete remodelling of the public space from “facade to facade”, leaving no space for buses, even with their own lanes. The introduction of the tram into some 20 French cities unquestionably improved their image, quality of life in the centre, helped to showcase their cultural heritage and was generally experienced positively by residents. In terms of mobility, the combination of radial tram networks and orbital bypasses reduced traffic pressure on the centres, but the transfer from the car to P.T.  was low, even non-existent at the level of the wider conurbation as a whole.²

These successes (in terms of opinion, if not in practice) put the Paris region in a new position. Previously “cutting-edge” with its innovations (light railway network, “carte orange” monthly travel card), it appeared to have been “overtaken” by the provincial cities in several respects: the revival of the tram on new principles, self-service bicycle hire, very short-term car rental.  The current period (except the so-called Grand Huit project, which we will come back to) seems to be a time when the region is importing innovations developed by France’s other big cities. It will probably continue, notably with the establishment of several combined “suburban” district groupings, where politicians have realised that their areas are as large and populous as provincial cities, without having the same level and quality of internal public transport provision.

Table I.7

Public transport : facts, representations and opinions

 

PUBLIC TRANSPORT : ideal organisation of the PT supply	Rank in Idf in 2010	Rank in other large cities in 2010	Rank in Idf in 1990	Rank in other large cities in 1990
The ideal way to achieve the best service would be to provide P.T. service through a single company	1 (government as well as regional view)	1 (government as well as regional view)	1 (government as well as regional view)	1 (government as well as regional view)
The ideal way to achieve the best service would be a single public transport authority, whatever the structure of the providers
The ideal situation would be a public authority for mobility, including PT and road and parking management	2 (regional view)	2 (regional view)	2 (regional view)	2 (regional view)
Competitive tendering for operations is good as a way of ensuring the lowest costs, fitting supply to demand and achieving quality of service	3 Used only for some specific bus services	3 Debates on this point, linked to financial problems		3 Long-standing opposition
Other significant argument

 

 

 

PUBLIC TRANSPORT :Public money	Situation in Idf in 2010	Situation in idf in 1990	Situation in other large cities towns in 2010	Situation in other large cities in 1990
The benefits from public transport provision justify the investment of public money	Ok for government and region	OK for gov and region	OK	OK
The benefits from PT provision justify the use of public funds for operational costs	Ok for region	Ok for gov and region	OK	OK
The use of public money for operational costs should be restricted to social fares	Opposed	Opposed	Opposed	opposed
Public money is scarce and should be kept for major investments, when available	Impossible	Impossible	Impossible	Impossible

 

 

PUBLIC TRANSPORT : Fare policy	Situation in Idf in 2010	Situation in idf in 1990	Situation in other large cities towns in 2010	Situation in other large cities in 1990
There is no single P.T. fare system that is affordable for the different companies	yes	yes	yes	yes
For comparable O/D, fares are different on the bus system and the train/tube systems	no	no	no	no
For comparable O/D, fares are higher in peak hours	no	no	no	no
Fares tend to reflect costs, the greater the distance, the higher the price	Fares rise much more slowly than costs in relation to distance. Trend towards a single fare	In most cases, a single fare for urban but not regional transport	Fares rise less than costs in relation to distance	In most cases a single fare for urban but not regional transport
Fares rise much more slowly than costs in relation to distance	Fares rise much more slowly than costs in relation to distance.Trend towards a single fare	In most cases, a single fare	Fares rise less than costs in relation to distance	In most cases a single fare
Concessionary cards exist which make it possible to travel freely in a given zone for a given period	Yes, and those who hold them pay much lower fares than with tickets	yes	yes	yes
When somebody uses several means of transport in a given trip, the total fare is less than the sum of the fares for the different sections	Yes with travel card and tickets		Yes with travel card, sometimes with tickets (in progress)

 

PUBLIC TRANSPORT : Information policy	Situation in Idf in 2010	Situation in idf in 1990
It is generally considered that overall information on the network (maps, routes, schedules, fares) is good and well coordinated	yes	yes
It is generally considered that real time information on services is good	Yes (major progress)	no